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ARTICLES

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
PatriciaL. McKenney*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article reviews recent developments in the law affecting
administrative procedure in Virginia.1 The 1997 General Assembly made no substantive changes to the Commonwealth's
fundamental law of administrative procedure, but it did make
numerous amendments to agency law affecting administrative
case decisions. Among the major changes to agency procedures
include authorizing the Commissioner of Social Services to
review local board eligibility decisions,2 extending the powers of
health regulatory boards that govern the licensing of health
professionals,, and permitting the air, water and waste boards
to implement mediation and voluntary dispute resolution proceedings.4
Perhaps of greater interest to those interested in developments in administrative procedure in 1997 were two requests
for studies and several amendments to the Virginia Administrative Process Act (VAPA)5 that the General Assembly considered
* BA, 1982, University of Virginia; J.D., 1991, College of William and Mary.
1. This article addresses legislation from the 1997 session of the General Assembly, other promulgated law published in 1997, and court decisions issued in 1996 and
the first five months of 1997.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 22-28.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 29-37.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 38-42.
5. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1-:25 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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but failed to pass. The interest garnered by these bills indicate
that the upcoming session may bring important changes in
VAPA. The issues referred for study include a measure calling
for a study of the efficacy of VAPAs and a measure to study
and propose model rules for the conduct of hearings by independent hearing officers.7 The amendments to VAPA which failed
passage by the General Assembly included multiple proposals.
One proposal would have required that formal hearings under
VAPA authorize discovery proceedings. Another proposal would
have required that agencies articulate detailed explanations of
the bases of their decisions in hearings.8 A proposal addressing
ex parte communications during agency adjudications also failed
to pass.' In addition, legislation that would have extended to
public assistance cases the same standard of judicial review
applicable to case decisions and legislation did not pass the
General Assembly's approval. This standard of judicial review
grants those individual's denied public assistance the right to
challenge in court any regulation applied in their cases."
Meanwhile, the state circuit courts and the Virginia Court of
Appeals continued to shape administrative procedure through
decisional law. Three cases of interest addressing procedural
matters are reported below. " In addition, four circuit court
opinions are reported in which the court found the agencies
failed to have substantial evidence in the record for their decisions. 2 Finally, two cases are discussed in which the court of
appeals found fault with the trial courts' interpretations of the
controlling statute and, therefore, reversed the trial courts'
decisions."
In the cases discussed herein, it is interesting to note the
courts' records of decision making. It appears that the Virginia
Court of Appeals' decade of deciding cases has not yet fully
established its role on administrative issues. In three of the

6. See infra text accompanying note 49.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55.

8. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70.

10. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 79-121.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 123-80.

13. See infra text accompanying notes 181-216.
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four appeals from the circuit courts discussed herein, the court
of appeals reversed the trial court decisions.'4 Of even greater
interest is the circuit courts' track record; in six of the seven
cases originating in the circuit courts that are discussed, the
circuit court reversed the agency decision. 5
II. LEGISLATIVE INITTES
A. LegislationAffecting Virginia Administrative Case Deciding

In 1997, the General Assembly passed several amendments
to agency laws which affect administrative case law. One law
amended was the Virginia Public Assistance and Welfare Law
in Title 63.1 of the Virginia Code, which governs programs for
aid to dependent children, the aged, the blind, and the disabled,
and provides assistance in the form of food stamps, medical and
fuel subsidies, general relief payments and social services. 6
Generally, those in need of such assistance must apply to local
boards that investigate and determine eligibility.' The law
affords applicants frustrated with local boards' eligibility decisions an opportunity for review at the state level. 8 Until this
year, a petition for such review went to the Virginia Board of
Social Services.' 9 The Board could itself hear the case, convene
a committee of three Board members to hear it, or else authorize a hearing officer to handle the case.2" The Board could
confer on the hearing officer the power to make a final decision,
and had the discretion to review the hearing officer's decision."
The 1997 General Assembly amended the Virginia Public
Assistance and Welfare Law, shifting review of local board
eligibility decisions from the Board to the Commissioner of
Social Services.' Under the revised law, the Commissioner

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See cases discussed infra at text accompanying notes 86-104, 181-216.
See cases discussed infra at text accompanying notes 86-104, 123-80, 198-209.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-1 to -330 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
See, e.g., id. §§ 63.1-55.1 to -58.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
See id. § 63.1-116 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
See id. § 63.1-116 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
See i.
See id.

22. See id. § 63.1-116 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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now has the authority to delegate the power to review such
decisions to a hearing officer.' The amendment, however, did
not transfer to the Commissioner the power held by the Board
of Social Services under the prior codification to set aside a
decision of a hearing officer to whom was delegated the power
to review.'
The new law, instead, authorizes the Commissioner to appoint a panel to review these state-level case decisions by hearing officers, but does not empower the panel to overturn or set
aside the decisions.' The panel may merely consider the administrative hearing decisions to "determine if any changes are
needed in the conduct of future hearings, or to policy and procedures related to the issue of the administrative appeal.' The
panel is to periodically report its findings to the Commissioner." The result of this change appears to be that hearing officers reviewing the decisions of local social services boards for
the Commissioner now render judgments of greater finality
than before. As before, such reviews at the state level include
additional factfinding and are not limited to the record prepared for and by the local social service boardY
The General Assembly in 1997 also extended the powers of
health regulatory boards that govern the licensing of health
professionals with two amendments to Title 54.1 of the Virginia
Code. First, the General Assembly delegated to all health regulatory boards the power to summarily suspend licenses without
a hearing if the regulatory board finds "a substantial danger to
the public health or safety."' The boards that oversee medicine, nursing, dentistry, optometry, pharmacy, psychology, and
veterinary medicine already enjoyed such power. 0 Now, the
boards governing audiology, speech pathology, funeral services,
nursing home administrators, marriage and family counseling,
23. See id.
24. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-116 (Repl. Vol. 1995), with VA. CODE ANN. §
63.1-116 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
25. See id. § 63.1-116 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. § 63.1-117 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2408.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
30. See id. §§ 54.1-2708(B), -2920, -3009(B), -3605(7), -3217, -3317, -3808 (Repl.
Vol. 1994).
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and social work have the same authority.3 ' Proceedings leading
to a hearing must be initiated at the same time the license is
suspended, and the hearing must occur within a reasonable
time thereafter. 2 The boards may exercise this power by telephonic conference call.'
The second innovation affecting health regulatory boards is
the extension, to other boards, of the power now enjoyed by the
boards of nursing and medicine to appoint special conference
committees for informal hearings under VAPA, section 96.14:11. Comprised of two or more board members, the special conference committee may exonerate, reinstate, place on
probation, reprimand, or impose a fine on a practitioner, but
these committees cannot suspend or revoke the license of a
practitioner.35 When a special conference committee disposes of
a case by order, it becomes final in thirty days, unless appealed
to the appropriate board.36 The Board then proceeds with a
formal hearing in accordance with VAPA, section 9-6.14:12." 7
Whether the action of a special conference committee constitutes alternate dispute resolution is debatable, but an obvious
innovation of that sort occurred in the 1997 session of the General Assembly in the environmental context. The 1997 amendments to Title 10.1 of the Virginia Code authorize the air, water, and waste boards to implement non-binding mediation and
voluntary dispute resolution proceedings as established under
Title 8.01." Under the new law, these environmental regulatory boards may resort to such procedures either for the purpose of rulemaking or the issuance of a permit at the board's
discretion.39 The statute, however, requires use of these procedures in the issuance of a permit only if the permit applicant
31. See id. § 54.1-2408.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997) (applying to all health regulatory
boards), § 54.1-2500 (Repl. Vol. 1994) (defining "health regulatory board").
32. See id. § 54.1-2408.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).

33. See id.
34. See id. § 54.1-2400(9) (Cum. Supp. 1997). This amendment specifically noted
its intent that it not be construed to "affect the authority or procedures of the Boards
of Medicine and Nursing pursuant to [VA. CODE ANN.] §§ 54.1-2919 and 54.1-3010."
'CL
35. See id. § 54.1-2400(10) (Cum. Supp. 1997).

36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See

id.
id
VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186.3 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
id. § 10.1-1186.3(A), (B) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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consents and participates. In other words, the permit applicant
is authorized to terminate the proceedings.' A board's decision
to employ mediation or dispute resolution is not subject to judicial review.41
Curiously drafted, the Act directs the boards to consider
refraining from using a mediation or dispute resolution proceeding in a number of circumstances. The language of the Act
seemingly appears to permit the boards from refraining to use
such proceedings in any given case. The Act states:
The Boards shall consider not using a mediation or dispute resolution proceeding if.
1. A definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is
required for precedential value, and such a [mediation or
dispute resolution] proceeding is not likely to be accepted
generally as an authoritative precedent;
2. The matter involves or may bear upon significant
questions of state policy that require additional procedures
before a final resolution may be made, and such a proceeding would not likely serve to develop a recommended policy
for the Board;
3. Maintaining established policies is of special importance, so that variations among individual decisions are not
increased and such a proceeding would not likely reach consistent results among individual decisions;
4. The matter significantly affects persons or organizations who are not parties to the proceeding;
5. A full public record of the proceeding is important, and
a mediation or dispute resolution proceeding cannot provide
such a record; and
6. The Board must maintain continuing jurisdiction over
the matter with the authority to alter the disposition of the
matter in light of changed circumstances, and a mediation
or dispute resolution proceeding would interfere with the
Board's fulfilling that requirement.42
The 1997 General Assembly passed other minor amendments
affecting administrative procedure. These include an amendment to Title 4.2 relating to the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, which requires the board to transmit to retail licensees

40. See id. § 10.1-1186.3(A)(6) (Cur. Supp. 1997).
41. See id. § 10.2-1186.3(B).
42. Id. § 10.2-1186.3(AX1)-(6) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
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notices of decisions by hearing officers by. both regular and
certified mail with a returned receipt requested.' The licensee
has thirty days from the day notice was sent to appeal the
hearing officer's decision.' Also, in its amendments to the Virginia Gas and Oil Act, the General Assembly extended to gas
owners, gas operators, and gas storage field operators the right
of review de novo in the circuit courts.45 Under the existing
code, only coal owners and operators enjoyed this privilege."
The 1997 General Assembly also granted more exemptions
from the standard procedures that comprise VAPA. At its inception, the new Cotton Board was given an exemption from the
Article 2 requirements for rulemaking. In addition, the exemption from Article 2 mine inspection policies enjoyed by coal
mining was extended to mineral mining."
B. Studies Requested by 1997 General Assembly Portending
Future Changes to VAPA
Two requests for studies made in the 1997 session of the
General Assembly indicate that upcoming legislative sessions
may bring important changes in VAPA. First, a bill calling for
a comprehensive legislative study of the efficacy of VAPA was
introduced and referred for study.4" The bill's underlying assumption is that, while case deciding and judicial review procedures are by and large satisfactory, rulemaking has become too
cumbersome and time consuming.
Second, the Administrative Law Advisory Committee
(ALAC) ° was requested to study and propose model rules for

43. See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-111(BX5) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
44. See id.
45. See VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
46. Compare id. § 45.1-361.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997), with id. § 45.1-361.9(A) (Repl.

Vol. 1995).
47. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-1084 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
48. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(CX1O) (Cum. Supp. 1997).
49. See S.J. Res. 285, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997). The subject matter of
this resolution was referred by letter from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Rules to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on General Laws, requesting that a

study be conducted.
50. The Administrative Law Advisory Committee is a standing committee of the
Virginia Code Commission.
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the conduct of hearings by independent hearing officers under
section 9-6.14:14.1 of VAPA.5 ' With many agencies of the Commonwealth holding trial-type adjudications and with each agency following its own set of practice and procedure rules for
those adjudications, it had been suggested that uniformity
among these rules would be beneficial. Many of the adjudicatory proceedings of Virginia agencies are formal, while others are
conducted informally. 2 All state agencies and departments use
their own employees to conduct informal hearings, although the
VAPA allows parties to informal fact finding pursuant to section 9-6.14:11 to opt for an independent hearing officer instead
of an agency employee." While the State Corporation Commission, the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Employment Commission also use employees to conduct formal adjudications, VAPA directs most other state agencies and departments to use independent hearing officers to conduct formal
hearings." These independent hearing officers are selected by
the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia from
a list of volunteers and are provided to state agencies on request. Minimum qualifications for these hearing officers are set
forth in section 9-6.14:14.1 of VAPA."
This legislative effort follows another recent initiative in
Virginia to impart some uniformity in the administrative hearing process.5 6 At its November 13, 1996, meeting, the Associa51. See REPORT OF THE HEARING OFFICER RULEs SUBCOMMITTEE, at 1 (Oct. 15,
1997).
52. In a casual survey of Virginia State agencies conducted by the ALAC, 35 of
the 48 agencies responding reported that they conduct informal hearings. Of those 35,
27 also reported conducting formal hearings. See REPORT OF THE Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ADvIsORY CoMMITTEE, S. Doc.

No. 14, at Appendix (1995).
53. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:14.1 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
54. See id. Section 9-6.14:14.1 of the Virginia Code provides that all hearings
conducted in accordance with section 9-6.14:12 (formal hearing) shall be presided over
by a hearing officer selected from a list prepared and maintained by the Executive
Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia. This section also sets minimum standards for the hearing officers and provides that parties to proceedings conducted
pursuant to 9-6.14:11 (informal fact-finding) may agree to have a hearing officer preside at the proceeding. See id.
55. See id.
56. In addition to the recent initiatives discussed infra, in the last decade much
attention has been placed on the use of hearing officers in Virginia agency adjudications. In 1986, the General Assembly amended VAPA by adding section 9-6.14:14.1
governing the use of hearing officers in formal adjudicatory hearings, establishing
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tion of Virginia Hearing Officers (AVHO) adopted the Model
Rules of Practice for Hearing Officers Conducting Formal Hear-7
ings Pursuant to the Virginia Administrative Process Act.

This organization, comprised largely of hearing officers on the
supreme court's list, adopted these model rules as a public
service for the discretionary use by hearing officers whose
names appear on the supreme court's list. According to the
President of AVHO, these model rules were "not intended to
impose a uniform body of rules upon agencies fimctioning under
existing rules," but were offered to "serve as a basis for
amendment of existing agency rules as well as providing a
resource for newly created agencies with adjudicatory functions.cs
The legislative initiative and AVHO's rule modeling are both
moving formal case adjudication in Virginia in the direction of
procedural uniformity." When state agencies consider creating

minimum qualifications for the use of independent contractors as hearing officers, and
placing the Executive Secretary in charge of the system. In 1987, the Executive Secretary promulgated Hearing Officer System Rules of Administration affecting hearing
officer appointment, qualifications, training, and retention. In 1987, the Virginia State
Bar's Standing Committee on Legal Ethics issued an advisory opinion addressing
aspects of certain Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility disciplinary rules on
the independent hearing officer system. See John Paul Jones, Administrative Procedure, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 622-29 (1987).
57. See Are Model Practiceand Procedure Rules for Virginia Agency Adjudications
a Possibility, ADHiN. L. NEWS (Va. State Bar Sec. on Admin. L., Richmond, Va.),
Winter 1996, at 1, 2.
58. Letter from Joseph B. Kennedy, President, Association of Virginia Hearing
Officers, to Patricia McKenney (Dec. 10, 1996) (on file with author).
59. These separate activities geared toward providing some uniformity in hearing
procedures fall along the same lines of action taken by the former Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) several years ago. During the 1980s, ACUS
began examining the feasibility and practicality of preparing model rules for federal
agency adjudications. In 1993, an ACUS Working Group adopted the Model Adjudication Rules of practice and procedure for use in formal adjudications before federal
government agencies, and the rules were submitted and adopted by the Administrative Conference. The Administrative Conference circulated the Model Rules to all
federal agencies and encouraged them to review the rules with a view toward adopting them either in tote or individually as the need arose, in order to effect a reduction of the differences among federal agency formal adjudication practice and procedure rules. See generally, Michael P. Fox, The Model Adjudication Rules, 11 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 75 (1994). In fact, several agencies adopted portions of the rules
when modifying their agency's rules. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 18,866, 18,872 (1996) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 49 C.F.R.) (proposed April 29, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg.
28,021, 28,022 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 747).
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or revising their adjudication rules, these models will be helpful
references.
C. Legislative Measures to Amend VAPA which Failed
Several bills to amend VAPA were considered in the 1997
General Assembly. Although the measures failed, the interest
that accompanied the bills indicates that the issues may be
raised again in upcoming sessions.
1. Discovery for Formal Hearings
A bill carried over from the 1996 session of the General Assembly, which would have amended Article 3 of the VAPA, was
left in the Senate General Laws Committee in the 1997
session. ° This bill would have authorized (for formal hearings
under section 9-6.14:12 of VAPA) the full scope of discovery
proceedings provided in Title 8.01 of the Virginia Code and the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. 61 Since section 9-

6.14:13 of VAPA already permits depositions and requests for
admissions when good cause is shown, it appears this
amendment would have freed parties from the requirement for
prior agency approval and would have introduced interrogatories in administrative cases. 2
This legislation also would have required agencies to articulate detailed explanations of the factual or procedural bases of
decisions or recommended decisions based on evidence in the
record of both informal' and formal hearings.' This would
have added to the requirement currently found in VAPA sections 9-6.14:11 and 9-6.14:12 that the agency supply a factual
and procedural basis for adverse action.

60. See H.B. 1421, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997). Article 3 of VAPA governs case decisions, that is, the outcomes of administrative adjudication. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
61. See H.B. 1421; see also REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ADVISORY COMMITEE ON THE DISCOVERY IN APA CASE DECISIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, H. Doc. No. 53
(1997).
62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:13 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
63. See id. § 9-6.14:11 (Cur. Supp. 1997).
64. See id. § 9-6.14:12 (Cur. Supp. 1997).
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2. Ex parte Communications During Agency Adjudications
Another bill that would have affected agency decision making
that was carried over from the 1996 session of the General
Assembly, failed in committee in the 1997 session. After proposals in 1994 and 1995 to prohibit or limit ex parte communications during administrative agency proceedings, the ALAC
recommended legislation to the 1996 General Assembly that
would have simply required that agencies promulgate policies to
address ex parte communications during agency adjudications.' Although this proposal did not advance out of committee in the 1997 session, the interest that ex parte communications has garnered over the past years makes it likely that the
topic will continue to be debated in upcoming sessions of the
legislature.
At present, neither statute nor case decision prohibits ex
parte communications in administrative adjudications conducted
under VAPA. In contrast, section 554(c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, section 4-213 of the 1981 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Administrative Procedure Acts in three of the five states located in the Fourth Circuit all prohibit ex parte communications in agency adjudicatory
settings.
A subcommittee of the ALAC studied the issue beginning in
1995 and found that few Virginia agencies had written policies
to govern ex parte communications during agency hearings and
appeals. 7 The subcommittee study also found that Virginia
agencies vary greatly in the function and format of their admin-

65. See REPORT OF THE Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS SUBCOMMITIEE OF THE AD-

MnISTRATIVE LAW ADVISORY COMMrTTEE, H. Doc. No. 53, at 1-2 (1996).
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. The AAC Ex parte Communications Subcommittee conducted a survey in
1995 and found that of the 52 agencies that issue case decisions, only six have written policies prohibiting ex psrte communications, 15 have informal policies prohibiting
ex parte communications and 19 have no policies on the matter at all. The survey
also revealed that five agencies freely permit ex parte communications in case decisions. See REPORT OF THE Ex PARTE COMmuNICATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ADVISORY COMmTrEE, at Appendix (1995). See also ALAC Completes

Admin. Process Studies, ADMIN. L. NEws (Va. State Bar Sec. on Admin. L., Richmond, Va.), Fall 1995, at 5, 6.

918

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:907

istrative proceedings. The subcommittee expressed concern that
prescribing one method to address ex parte communications
could "hamper informal efforts at conflict resolution and...
disrupt the beneficial flow of information during the early administrative process of developing and issuing case decisions.'

Thus, ALAC proposed legislation that simply offered a definition of ex parte communication which was more precise than
that currently utilized in Virginia and which required agencies
to promulgate their own policy on ex parte communications.'
The legislation defined ex parte communication as
an oral or written communication not in the agency's or
board's record regarding substantive, procedural, or other
matters which could be reasonably expected to influence the
outcome of the case or the case decision pending before the
agency or board and for which reasonable notice to all parties is not given at the time of the communication. 7
This proposal took into account the differences among Virginia
agencies in their administrative proceedings, while ensuring
public participation in the development of ex parte policies by
requiring that the policies be promulgated as regulations subject to notice and comment.
3. Extension of Substantial Evidence Standard of Judicial
Review to Public Assistance Cases
In the 97th Session of the General Assembly, legislation that
would have extended to public assistance cases in Virginia the
same standard of judicial review applicable to case decisions
made by agencies, other than those deciding public assistance
cases, did not pass.7 ' The bill also proposed granting persons
denied public assistance the right to challenge in, court any

68. REPORT OF THE EX PARTE ComMUNICATIoNS SuBcommnv
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ADVISORY COMMITTEE, at 2 (1996).
69. In Virginia, an ex parte communication has been defined as "one in which an
advocate for but one of two or more parties presents his views upon the controversy
to the decision maker." 1982-83 Op. Va. Attey Gen. 4-5.
70. See S.B. 479, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997).
71. See S.B. 937, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1997).
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regulation applied in their cases, specifically on the ground that
the regulation exceeds the scope of the department's authority.72 This bill initially faced opposition in both houses of the
legislature because members were concerned the measure would
affect the state's welfare reform laws. 3 Subsequent support
this measure obtained in the form of amendments alleviated
those concerns, making it likely that the changes proposed by
this measure will be raised again in the future.74
The bill proposed two changes to section 9-6.14:16(B) of
VAPA. In its present form, section 9-6.14:16(B) limits a court's
review of denials for public assistance to "ascertaining whether
there was evidence in the agency record to support the case
decision of the agency acting as the trier of fact."'5 This standard requires a court to sustain a decision that an applicant is
ineligible if the Department of Medical Assistance Services
(DMAS) or the Department of Social Services (DSS), the two
state agencies handling public assistance cases, can point to
any evidence at all in the record.
Under this "any evidence at all" standard, a reviewing court
must uphold a decision by DSS or DMAS even when the record
is so weak or conflicting as to be irrational. So long as the
department can point to one piece of evidence that, when considered in isolation from all the rest, supports the decision, that
decision must be allowed to stand.
Currently, for case decisions made by agencies other than
DSS or DMAS, VAPA section 9-6.14:17 requires a reviewing
court to ascertain "whether there was substantial evidence in
72. See id
73. Tyler Whitley, Beyer's Vote Passes Welfare Reform Measure, RICIL TIU-DISPATCH, Feb. 5, 1997, at A7.
74. S.B. 937 was closely contested in the Senate, necessitating, not once, but
twice, a tie-breaking vote by Lt. Governor Donald S. Beyer, Jr. to pass the bill. After
the House voted for an amendment that would have rendered the bill ineffective, the
House requested a conference committee on the bill and the Senate acceded. The
conference amended the bill to the satisfaction of the House; the bill passed in the
House with a vote of 92-3. A series of mishaps prevented the conference report from
being forwarded to the Senate in a timely fashion. When the Senate finally voted, the
measure failed by only one vote, and other Senate business prevented the matter
from being reconsidered before the House adjourned for the session. See APA Amendment Just Misses in 97th Session, ADMIN. L. NEWS (Va. State Bar Sec. on Admin. L.,
Richmond, Va.), Spring 1997, at 2, 3.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
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the agency record upon which the agency as the trier of the
facts could reasonably find them to be as it did."" Ordinarily,
this is not a difficult test for an agency. For example, it prohibits a court from reversing an agency decision whenever the
weight of the evidence supports the applicant. Courts reviewing
the fact finding of agencies according to this standard look to
the record only for substantial evidence, not to see if the balance or preponderance of the evidence favors the agency's decision. Thus, making this standard of review applicable to public
assistance cases arguably would not significantly jeopardize
reasonable agency fact-finding in welfare and Medicaid cases.
In its present form, paragraph B of section 9-6.14:16 also
bars those refused public assistance from appealing to a court
the administrative regulation applied in their cases, even when
the regulation exceeds the scope of the department's authority
under statute." The statute currently states: "The validity of
any statute, regulation, standard or policy, federal or state,
upon which the action of the agency was based shall not be
subject to review by the court."78 This prohibition of court review of the statutes, regulations, standards and policies also
sets judicial oversight of DMAS and DSS action apart from
judicial oversight of the actions of other state agencies. The
legislation proposed in the 1997 General Assembly would have
removed this insulation of welfare legislation, applying instead
the checks and balances provided by judicial review elsewhere
in the regulatory context.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AFFECTING ADMINISmATIvE
PROCEDURE

A. Court of Appeals Addresses Procedural Issues: Is Remand
Appealable? When Do Time Limits Begin to Run? What
Constitutes an Agency Record?
In 1996-97, the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed several
procedural issues arising in the context of agency adjudication.

76. See id. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1993) (emphasis added).
77. See id. § 9-6.14:16(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
78. Id.
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In Hoyle v. Virginia Employment Commission, 9 the court of

appeals held that the order of the Prince William County Circuit Court, remanding a proceeding to the Virginia Employment
Commission (VEC), was not appealable when the order directed
the commission to conduct a complete hearing, receive additional evidence, and render a further decision. The case involved a
decision by the VEC that Hoyle was qualified for unemployment benefits following her discharge from employment by the
United States Postal Service. Upon a petition for judicial review
of that decision, the circuit court remanded the case to the
commission pursuant to Virginia Code section 9-6.14:19. Hoyle
appealed, contending that the circuit judge lacked jurisdiction to
remand the case and that the evidence in the record supported
the commission's finding that she was not discharged for misconduct connected with her work.80
The court of appeals in Hoyle did not discuss the reviewability of the remand in the context of the VAPA, indicating that it
seemed clear to the court that a remand pursuant to VAPA is
not reviewable as a final decision. Instead, the court of appeals
based its decision on the description of jurisdiction in Virginia
Code section 17-116.05(1). This section authorizes the court of
appeals to review "any final decision of a circuit court on appeal from a decision of an administrative agency.""' The court
cited Southwest Virginia Hospitals v. Lipps for the proposition
that a "final decision" referred to in the statute was a decision
"'which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief that is
contemplated and leaves nothing to be done by the court."' 2
The Hoyle court explained that the trial judge's remand order
'"did not resolve any factual or legal issues concerning the merits of the case[ ]" and was simply "an interlocutory ruling
that required further action" which did not necessitate an immediate appeal."

79. 24 Va. App. 533, 484 S.E.2d 132 (1997).
80. See id. at 537, 484 S.E.2d at 134.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.05(1) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
82. Hoyle, 24 Va. App. at 537, 484 S.E.2d at 133 (citing Southwest Va. Hosps. v.
Lipps, 193 Va. 191, 193, 68 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1951)).

83. Id. at 537, 484 S.E.2d at 133-34 (citing Canova Elec. Contracting Inc. v. LMI
Ins. Co., 22 Va. App. 595, 600, 471 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1996)).
84. Id. at 537, 484 S.E.2d at 134.
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In Virginia Retirement System v. Rizzo,' the issue on appeal
was at what point in the adjudication process did the time
limitations of section 9-6.14:11 of VAPA began to run. At issue
in the case was the Virginia Retirement System's (VRS's) denial
of disability benefits to Rizzo. Pursuant to section 9-6.14:11(D),
Rizzo contended that VRS's failure to resolve the issue of benefits within the time limits prescribed in the statute resulted in
a decision in Rizzo's favor.86
Section 9-6.14:11 provides time limits for agency decision
making for various types of hearings. Specifically, section 96.14:11(D) is applicable to the situation in Rizzo's case. In an
informal fact-finding proceeding in which a hearing officer is
not rendering the decision, the agency personnel or commission
responsible for the decision must make that decision "within
ninety days from the date of the informal fact-finding
proceeding."87 The section further provides that if the decision is not
made within the prescribed time frame, then the party to the
case decision can make a written notification to the agency that
a decision is due. If the agency fails to make a decision within
thirty days of its receipt of the notice, then "the decision is
deemed to be in favor of the named party."'
In Rizzo, VRS's denial of disability benefits was appealed by
Rizzo, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.8 9
On remand, the VRS held a hearing, at which time Rizzo incorporated all of his evidence from the previous administrative
proceeding and introduced further medical evidence from his
psychiatrist to establish his disability. The VRS representative at the hearing forwarded the transcript of Rizzo's
psychiatrist's testimony to VRS after receiving it and requested
VRS forward it to the Medical Board for comment on the medical evidence.9 The Medical Board requested and obtained permission from the VRS to forward the evidence to a doctor for

85. 23 Va. App. 698, 479 S.E.2d 535 (1997).
86. Id. at 704, 479 S.E.2d at 538.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:11(D) (Repl. Vol. 1993).

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
See Rizzo, 23 Va. App. at 699-700, 479 S.E.2d at 535.
See id. at 700-03, 479 S.E.2d at 536-37.
See id. at 703, 479 S.E.2d at 537.
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review." The transfer of the transcript through these channels
delayed consideration of the evidence for more than ninety days
and the VRS did not issue a decision in the required time
frame. On two occasions after ninety days had elapsed, Rizzo
notified the agency that a decision was due.9"
The agency did not render a decision within thirty days of
Rizzo's notice, as it had not received the doctor's evaluation of
Rizzo's medical evidence. After receipt of the doctor's evaluation,
VRS issued its decision denying Rizzo benefits. Rizzo appealed
the decision and requested the Circuit Court of Orange County
to enter summary judgment on the matter because VRS had
failed to issue its decision within the time limit prescribed by
the statute." The circuit court granted summary judgment and
the court of appeals reversed the trial court decision.95
The court of appeals found that the time limitations in the
VAPA section 9-6.14:14.1 governed the agency's decision-rendering responsibility and were not applicable to the fact-gathering
role of the agency.' The court of appeals determined that the
fact-gathering stage, whether accomplished informally or formally, provides the basis for which a case will be decided and
compared this process to the making of the record in a court of
law or equity. 7 The court distinguished the fact-gathering
stage from the decision-rendering stage and found that the time
limitations of section 9-6.14:11(D) began "to run from the date
the fact-finding proceeding is completed." 8
In determining when the fact gathering process of an agency
is complete, the court stated that the nature of the case, the
case record and the basic law governing the agency encompass
the scope of the fact-gathering proceeding in each case." In
this regard, the court determined that an agency's fact-gathering process could encompass more than a hearing."° The

92. See id.
93. See id. at 704, 479 S.E.2d at 538.

94. See id95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. at 705, 708, 479 S.E.2d at 538, 540.
See id. at 706-07, 479 S.E.2d at 539.
See id. at 706 & n.5, 479 S.E.2d at 539 & n.5.
Id. at 707, 479 S.E.2d at 539 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
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court found support for this proposition in the Reviser's Note to
section 9-6.14:11, which states that, in addition to conferences
or consultations, "[t]o the extent that basic laws permit, agencies may also proceed on the basis of inspections, tests, or elections, followed by such conference-consultation procedures as
the case issues may require."''
The court held that in Rizzo's case the basic law governing
the agency did not authorize VRS to render its decision until it
had received the report of the Medical Board on the medical
evidence upon which Rizzo had based his application." The
court held that VRS' receipt of this report was a necessary part
of the fact-gathering aspect of the case, not the decision-rendering process." Thus, the court held that the time requirements of section 9-6.14:11(D) did not begin to run until VRS
received the report. Based on this statement, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of Rizzo's motion for summary judgment. 1°4
In Snyder v. Virginia Employment Commission, 5 the court
of appeals made an interesting determination of what constituted an agency record in a hearing before the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC). In this case, Snyder appealed the
VEC's denial of unemployment benefits contending, inter alia,
that she did not receive a fair hearing because the appeals
examiner and the VEC relied upon "investigatory" documents
compiled by a deputy of the VEC in reaching its decision."°
The VEC and the appeals examiner relied upon documents
included in the "Record of Facts Obtained by Deputy" in making their findings of fact.' 7 Snyder contended that these documents were not part of the record because they were not introduced into evidence nor expressly made part of the record by
the appeals examiner during the evidentiary hearing."° As a

101. Id. (citing the Reviser's Note to VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:11 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).

102. See id. at 707-08, 479 S.E.2d at 540.
103. See id. at 708, 479 S.E.2d at 540.
104. See id.

105.
106.
107.
108.

23 Va. App. 484, 477 S.E.2d 785 (1996).
See id at 486, 477 S.E.2d at 786.
See id. at 487, 477 S.E.2d at 787.
See id.
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result, Snyder claimed she was denied the opportunity to confront or rebut this evidence."°
The court of appeals noted that the manner in which disputed claims are presented before the VEC is prescribed by VEC
regulations and not common law or statutory rules of evidence;
therefore, the court of appeals looked to the VEC rules."0 The
VEC rule regarding a claimant's appeal to the VEC provides
that, except for specified exceptions, '"all appeals to the VEC
shall be decided on the basis of a review of the record.""" The
court found that the VEC rules used the term "record" in two
different instances: (1) the record that is sent to the appeals
examiner which contains the record of facts of the proceeding
before the deputy;" and (2) the record which includes the
transcript and exhibits offered during the evidentiary hearing
before the appeals examiner."' Although Snyder argued that
was limited to the latter, the court rejected
the term "record"
4
that view."

The court instead found that the "Record of Facts Obtained
by Deputy" was a part of the record properly considered by the
appeals examiner and the VEC in making their findings of
fact." 5 The court stated that "t]he documents were placed in
the VEC's file and became part of the VEC record for purposes
of the VEC's determination of the claim."" 6
Although the court stated that its decision was based on its
interpretation of the agency's rules, the court also found important for its determination that the record of the hearing indicated that Snyder had notice of the documents at issue and, in
fact, that her attorney may have had the actual documents in
his possession. The court noted that the appeals examiner at
the hearing had introduced for the record a letter submitted by

109. See i4iat 487, 477 S.E.2d at 786.
110. See id.at 487, 477 S.E.2d at 786-87.
111. Id. at 487, 477 S.E.2d at 787 (citing VR 300-01-8 § 3.B (1994)) (emphasis
added).
112. See id. at 488, 477 S.E.2d at 787 (citing VR 300-01-8 § 1.B (1994)).
113. See id (citing VR 300-01-8 §§ 2.F, 2.F.4 (1994)).
114. See idLat 487, 477 S.E.2d 787.
115. See id
116. I. at 488, 477 S.E.2d at 787.
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the employer that referred to the documentation."' Although
the hearing examiner did not explicitly identify the documents
at issue, the court stated that the examiner's purpose for introducing the employer's letter was to put Snyder on notice that
the employer was relying on documents already in the VEC's
files."' The court noted that Snyder's attorney had the opportunity to object to these documents, but did not object."' Additionally, the court stated that the record indicated that
Snyder's attorney had the documents, contradicting Snyder's
argument that she did not have the opportunity to review nor
rebut them.'20 Finally, the court pointed out that Snyder could
have chosen to inspect the file before or during the hearing and
object to any documents in the file as well as offer rebuttal evidence. 2 '
2. The Circuit Courts Find Fault with Agency Decision
Making: No Support in the Record
In the four circuit court opinions reported below, the circuit
courts indicate their unwillingness to uphold an agency decision
when the agency record fails to support the findings of the
agency. This supervision by the circuit courts can be presented
as either evidence supporting or evidence opposing the legislation (calling for articulation of agency decisions based on the
record) that was introduced but failed to pass." These decisions indicate the courts' willingness to reverse agency decisions
based on the law as it stands; these decisions also indicate that
the agencies failed to articulate the basis for their decisions on
the record.
In Convalescent Care, Inc. v. Commonwealth,' the Richmond Circuit Court reviewed an appeal of a decision of the
Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) and found
that, in several instances, the agency's determination was arbi-

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 489, 477 S.E.2d at 787.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
40 Va. Cir. 107 (Richmond City 1996).
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trary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record. Convalescent Care, Inc. (CCI), a corporation that
has ownership interest in and administers five nursing home
facilities in Virginia, challenged DMAS's adjustments to the
cost reports of CCI, which resulted in a reduction in the reimbursement paid to CCI under the Commonwealth's Medicaid
program.' DMAS is the state agency responsible for administering the state's Medicaid program and operates an auditing
program to determine the reimbursable costs for participating
providers.'
On appeal, CCI challenged, inter alia, DMAS's method for
determining the allowable salaries of CCI's home office executives.' The court rejected several of the DMAS methods used
to determine the allowable salaries.' First, the court held
that DMAS's practice of limiting reimbursement for executive
salaries to a percentage range of an Executive Compensation
Service (ECS) survey was an arbitrary and capricious application of the Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM), which applies to reimbursements under Medicaid.' The ECS survey
was a national survey of salaries of executives in similar positions.' DMAS limited reimbursement for executive salaries to
the salaries found in the ECS survey between the 25th and
75th percentiles. 3 ' After DMAS rated an executive based on a
point system, the agency placed the executive, based on the rating, on a scale within the 25th and 75th percentiles of the ECS
survey. DMAS justified this practice by stating that "Virginia's

124. See i- at 108.
125. See id.
126. Other issues on appeal, not discussed herein, included whether DMAS
properly disallowed interest costs on certain loans incurred by CCI and whether
DMAS properly limited the allowable compensation of CCrs medical director. See id.
The court aFirmed DMAS' determination on the majority of these issues. See id. at
113-18.
127. The court affirmed one method DMAS utilized in determining an executive's
allowable salary not discussed herein. That method involved adjusting the reimbursement of the salary based on an allocation of the executive's salary to six facilities in
which he was involved. See id. at 113.
128. See id. at 111-12.
129. See id.
130. See ii. at 110.
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taxpayers should not be expected to pay 'top dollar' for Medicaidrelated services."' 3 '
The court noted that no statute nor regulation presently
exists in Virginia to limit a provider's reimbursable executive
compensation, as DMAS was attempting to do.3 2 In the absence of such guidance, the court held DMAS to the language
in the agency's existing PRM. This manual allowed for the
reimbursement of reasonable compensation, defined as that
amount which "would ordinarily be paid for comparable services
by comparable institutions depending on the facts and circumstances of each case."" The manual further discussed reasonable compensation as being "limited to the fair market value of
services rendered by the owner in connection with patient
care,"'3 and defined fair market value as "the value determined by the supply and demand factors of the open market.""5 The court found DMAS's method of limiting executives'
reimbursable salary to a percentage range of the salaries in the
ECS survey was "directly at odds with such open market determination" as set forth in the PRM."' The court reversed
DMAS determination as arbitrary and capricious."
Based on the absence of supporting evidence in the record,
the court also reversed two other methods employed by the
agency for reducing ccrs reimbursement for executive salaries.
First, the court agreed with CCI that DMAS failed to produce
any support for the accuracy of the figures that the agency
used in deflating an executive's salary for inflation/deflation."
The agency had taken data available in 1989 and deflated it for
the three previous years based on a "trend table" which it did
not initially produce. Although the agency at the hearing did
produce the data for 1988, it never produced data for the previous years, and did not produce an explanation for how the
figures were deflated for the years prior to 1988."' The court
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 111.
See id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 111-12.
See id.
See id. at 112.
See id.
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noted that "there is a presumption of regularity in actions taken by a state agency, " " but stated that "[tihis does not mean,
however, that DMAS may arbitrarily create ranges of data
without empirical support."'
The court also found that DMAS failed to supply any evidence in the record to support its adjustments to the executive
The PRM prosalary based on geographic considerations.
vided that an executive's reimbursable salary should be determined with reference to "comparable institutions in the same
DMAS reduced the reimbursable salary
geographic area."'
for the executive based on this provision, but did not provide an
explanation of how the adjustment was calculated or why the
particular region was chosen as the relevant geographic
area.'" The court stated that "DMAS cannot rely on generalities and suppositions to make the types of adjustments which it
made here. Record evidence must exist. Because it does not
exist with regard to this issue, the adjustment will be
disallowed.""
In two circuit court cases reviewing determinations made by
the Department of Social Services (DSS), the trial court reversed the DSS's determinations, holding that the agency adduced no evidence to justify its findings of guilt. In C.R.G. v.
Brunty," a former Fairfax County schoolteacher challenged
the determination by the Commissioner of the DSS that five
complaints of sexual abuse against him were "Founded-Sexual
Abuse-Level .""4 The consequence of DSS making a Level 1

140. Id.
141. I&
142. See id.
143. I&
144. See id. at 112-13.
145. Id. at 113.
146. 38 Va. Cir. 431 (Fairfax County 1996).
147. Id at 431. A determination that a sixth complaint should be disposed of with
a finding of "Reason to Suspect-Sexual Abuse" was also challenged on appeal. The
reason to suspect category was struck down by the Virginia Court of Appeals in
Jackson v. Marshall, 19 Va. App. 628, 454 S.E.2d 23 (1995), and in C.R.G.'s case, the
reason to suspect finding was vacated by DSS. See id. at 431 n.1. C.R.G. also appealed on the ground that CPS and DSS failed to comply with various time requirements mandated by Title 63.1. The court, holding that C.R.G. failed to demonstrate
that any such failures were anything but harmless error, declined to reverse on this
ground. The court cited J.B. v. Brunty, 21 Va. App. 300, 464 S.E.2d 166 (1995), for
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finding against an individual is that the person's name is
"maintained in the Child Abuse and Neglect Information System (CANIS) central registry for 18 years past the date of [the]
complaint."' Such a finding for a teacher, the court noted,
would in effect end his or her career.
On appeal, the Fairfax County Circuit Court rejected the
factual findings of DSS stating that "the record in this case
utterly lacks any evidence of the kind of serious harm or the
likelihood of serious harm that would justify [the findings] ...
in any of the five cases before the Court. " "5° The court also
reversed the agency decision due to the agency's failure to comply with constitutional due process requirements. The court
found that due process requirements were not met in this case
because the accused was not allowed to challenge his complainants and did not face an impartial decision-maker. 5'
In reversing the factual findings of DSS, the court found that
the agency's findings of Level 1 abuse did not comport with the
definition of Level 1 abuse found in the agency's regulations
nor the description of the kinds of injuries and conditions that
could result in a Level 1 finding found in the CPS Manual. 52
Although the regulation and manual described the types of
serious injury that would justify a Level 1 finding, the agency
had argued that some of the alleged touches by the teacher to
the children took place over a period of time and that there
were multiple incidents to equate to the "serious harm" neces-

the proposition that the time requirements are procedural, not directory. See id. at
432 n.2.
148. Id. at 431 n.1. (citing Virginia Department of Social Services Regulation VR
615-45-1 § 2.2 (1991)).
149. See id. at 438.

150. Id. at 436.
151. See id. at 439-45.
152. See id. at 435-36. The court cited VR 61545-1 § 2.1.A as stating that a Level
1 disposition "includes those injuries/conditions, real or threatened, that result in or
were likely to have resulted in serious harm to a child." Id. at 435. The court quoted
the CPS Manual for the kinds of injuries and conditions which could result in a level
one finding- those that "[require medical attention in order to be remediated; the
injury is to the head, face, genitals, or is internal and located near a vital organ.
Injuries located in more than one place; the injuries were caused by the use of an
instrument such as a tool or weapon; and an inappropriate drug was administered or
a drug was given in an inappropriate dosage" Id.
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sary for a Level 1 finding." The court disagreed and its reasoning reflected its concern with the serious consequences of a
Level 1 finding for an accused. The court found that the
agency's argument "ignore[d] the DSS regulation that requires
injuries or conditions that result or are likely to result in serious harm to a child in order to place an individual's name in
the CANIS registry for eighteen years." "
In reversing the decision for due process violations, the court
took issue with the agency's investigation and hearing procedures. " The court found that in a case such as C.R.G.'s,
"where the decision rests exclusively upon testimonial evidence
by the complainants," the process and procedures which must
be afforded an accused must include some means of challenging
the complainants' statements." The court stated that an
accused must be allowed to "probe into and demonstrate inconsistencies in the complainants' statements, their perceptions,
and possible bias." 5' The court observed that an accused's
"need for cross-examination must be viewed in the context of
sexual abuse proceedings involving young children," but it also
identified ways to protect both the children and the accused's
rights." The court stated that "[ait a minimum, CPS and
other officials conducting interviews of the complainants should
audiotape the interviews and give transcripts to the
accused."'59 The court explained that this would enable "[t]he
accused [to] ...

challenge the statements directly to determine

whether inconsistencies exist.""c This procedure would also
permit the accused to "challenge the interrogation techniques
which may taint the complainants' perceptions or subtly pressure the child-complainant into providing answers the child

153. See id. at 436.
154. Id.
155. The court found that the harm to a teacher's career of a finding that the
teacher had sexually abused children under his or her care and the placement of the
teacher's name in the Child Abuse and Neglect Information System central registry
satisfied the first prong of the due process inquiry of a deprivation of a protectible
liberty or property interest. See id. at 437-39.
156. Id. at 441.

157. Id
158. Id. at 442.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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believes the interviewer wants to hear." 6 ' In addition, the
court noted that such transcripts would enhance the agency's
accuracy. The court identified specific discrepancies in the notes
of interviews with complainants in the instant case that called
the accuracy of the information before the
into question
162
agency.

The C.R.G. court also agreed with the plaintiff that the bias
of the CPS workers and the DSS Hearing Officer denied him
due process. The court identified the limitations inherent in a
CPS worker conducting the investigation in a sexual abuse
case, specifically stating that "CPS workers are not charged
with finding the truth, but with protecting children, so if they
err they naturally err on the side of the children."" The
court also identified specific instances in the investigation of
this case where the conduct of the CPS workers demonstrated
their bias. The court noted that certain conduct of the CPS
workers indicated that they had made a finding of sexual abuse
before they completed their investigation, thus demonstrating
their bias. The court noted, among other examples, the failure
of the workers to review any of the complainants' school records, the failure of the workers to interview the teacher with
whom the defendant taught his classes, the failure of the workers to interview the single witness who may have corroborated
or discredited one complainant's allegations, the actions of the
workers to mail a booklet on young girls and sexual abuse to a
complainant before the accused was interviewed, and the referral of a complainant to a victim assistance network before the
accused was interviewed.'
The court also concluded that the Hearing Officer who upheld
the CPS workers' disposition was also biased, noting that "the
Officer discounted the testimony of a private investigator, two
independent psychologists, and substantial undisputed evidence
from numerous witnesses that four of the five girls had poor
reputations for truthfulness and had been disciplined [by the
accused] in class."" As additional evidence of the Hearing
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
See id.
Id. at 443.
See id. at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
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Officer's bias, the court also considered the Officer's failure to
discuss the serious harm that the abuse allegedly has caused in
a Level 1 finding and his failure to mention the complete lack
of evidence on the intent of the accused that is required for a
finding under the statute." Finally, the court found as indicative of the Officer's bias, her denunciation of the accused for
introducing evidence in the hearing to impeach the
complainants' credibility and her suggestion that his remembering details about these students indicated his guilt."'
The court took the unusual action of reversing the findings of
the agency and directing DSS to remove the findings from the
CANIS registry." Although the court noted its duty, under
Virginia Code section 9-6.14:19, to suspend or set aside an
agency decision and remand the matter to the agency and not
undertake agency action directly, the court found that the procedural defects in the DSS proceedings could not be cured by a
remand to the agency. In particular, the court found that DSS
failed to comply with the minimum requirements of due process
by failing to keep a verbatim transcript of the interviews with
the alleged victims.'69
In J.L.W. v. Virginia Department of Social Services,7 ' the
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach also overturned a
DSS finding of the sexual abuse of a child. In J.L.W., the accused was the boyfriend of the alleged victim's mother. As in
C.R.G., the J.L.W. court was troubled by the department's failure to fully investigate the charges against the accused. The
question before the court in J.L.W. was not whether the
accused's due process rights had been violated, but whether
there was substantial evidence supporting the agency's determination of sexual abuse. The J.L.W. court was troubled, as was
the court in C.R.G., by the apparent bias of DSS in its investigation of the complaint and the Commissioner's office in its
handling of the appeal." The J.L.W. court expressed its concern regarding the DSS investigators and hearing officers' ac-

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See idt
See id. at 444-45.
See id. at 445.
See id.
39 Va. Cir. 239 (Virginia Beach City 1996).
See id. at 241.
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ceptance of the child's complaint without thoroughly examining
the conflicting evidence presented in support of the accused.
The court stated that DSS and the Commissioner had treated
the accused as if he "bore the burden of providing an explanation for why this child would fabricate such allegations against
"
him.12
The court opined that
it was the agency's responsibility, as part of a reasonable
investigation, to explore possible motivations for the child's
complaint and, in particular, more closely examine her
home life and relationship with her mother's boyfriend.
Only by conducting thorough and open-minded investigations will the needs of abused children be met and the
rights of persons accused of abuse be protected.' 3
In Ruane v. Virginia Real Estate Board,"4 Ruane appealed
an adverse ruling of the Virginia Real Estate Board (VREB) on
her application for a broker's license. This was Ruane's second
appeal to the circuit court concerning VREB's denial of her petition for a waiver of the experience requirement contained in
VREB regulations."' The Circuit Court of Fairfax County in
the first appeal ruled that the proceeding should be remanded
to the Board for reconsideration consistent with the opinion."6
On reconsideration, the VREB again denied Ruane's application
and she appealed the second denial to the circuit court."
In its consideration of this second appeal, the circuit court
evidenced its frustration with the VREB. The court reviewed
the VREB's seven reasons for denying Ruane's application and
found that the board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its
determination." 8 The court found that two of the board's reasons were "totally contrary to the record"; three of the reasons
had "no support for [the] finding in the record"; and two of the

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
1995).
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
39 Va. Cir. 242 (Fairfax County 1996).
See id. at 242.
See Ruane v. Virginia Real Estate Board, 36 Va. Cir. 420 (Fairfax County
See Ruane, 39 Va. Cir. at 242.
See id. at 243.
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reasons, if they were a general statement of Ruane's qualifications, were "contradicted by the record." 79
The court again remanded the case to the VREB and set
aside the board's order. The court voiced its frustration with
the VREB, stating that "while the court cannot dictate to the
Board what its decision should be; reason, common sense, and
justice suggest only one available course.""s
3. Court of Appeals Interprets Agencies' Statutes
Finally, in two cases appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's interpretation of the controlling agency statute. In Actuarial Benefits &
Design Corp. v. Virginia Employment Commission,l"' the employer, Actuarial Benefits & Design Corporation (Actuarial), appealed an order of the Richmond Circuit Court, which affirmed
the decision of the VEC that employee Lipcsey was entitled to
full unemployment benefits. Lipcsey had worked as a nanny for
Actuarial. Following an incident in which Lipcsey was offended
by the manner in which Actuarial's president spoke to her,
Lipcsey resigned giving two weeks notice.'8 2 Two days after
Lipcsey resigned, Actuarial fired Lipcsey, effective immediately,
and only paid Lipcsey for two days of her two-week notice period." After the VEC awarded Lipcsey full unemployment benefits, Actuarial appealed. A hearing was held and the appeals
examiner affirmed the award of benefits. Actuarial offered no
evidence at the hearing showing that Lipcsey was discharged
for misconduct. Actuarial appealed to the VEC, which affirmed
the appeals examiner's decision.'
On appeal to the Richmond City Circuit Court, the court
affirmed the VEC's decision that Lipcsey "was not discharged
due to misconduct under [Virginia] Code section 60.2-618(2) and

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 244.
23 Va. App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 735 (1996).
See id. at 643, 478 S.E.2d at 737.
See i.
See id. at 644, 478 S.E.2d at 737.
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that the two-week limit of [Virginia] Code section 60.2-612(8)
did not apply to Lipcsey's case.""
On appeal, the court of appeals reviewed the relevant statutes and found that "to receive unemployment benefits, a claimant must be eligible under [Virginia] Code section 60.2-612 and
not disqualified under section 60.2-618." The court explained
that section 60.2-612 deals with eligibility and section 60.2-618
deals with disqualification; and that "[a] claimant must be
eligible86 for benefits before his disqualification need be inquired
into.,"

Under section 60.2-612(8), an employee's eligibility for unemployment benefits is capped at two weeks where an employee
"has given notice of resignation to his employer and the employer subsequently made the termination of employment effective immediately,...

provided, that the [employee] could not

establish good cause for leaving work pursuant to § 60.2-618
and was not discharged for misconduct as provided in § 60.2618."17 The court of appeals explained the shifting of the burden of proof between the employee and employer under these
statutes. Under section 60.2-612, the claimant has the burden
of proving the eligibility requirements;
once that burden is
met, the "burden shifts to the employer to prove that the claimant is disqualified."8 Under section 60.2-618(1), the burden is
on the employer to prove that the claimant left work voluntarily; once an employer meets this burden, the claimant must
prove he left work for good cause so as to not be disqualified
for benefits.'o
Actuarial claimed the trial court erred because it affirmed
the commission's decision that Lipcsey was not disqualified
from receiving benefits. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision, holding that because Actuarial failed to prove
that Lipcsey left work voluntarily, the burden never shifted to

185.
186.
Comp.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 645, 478 S.E.2d at 737 (citing Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment
Comm'n, 195 Va. 997, 1000, 81 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1954)).
VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-612(8) (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cun Supp. 1997).
See Actuarial Benefits, 23 Va. App. at 645, 478 S.E.2d at 737-38.
Id. at 645, 478 S.E.2d at 738.
See id.
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her to prove good cause and the commission was not required
to make a finding on this issue.191
The court of appeals, however, agreed with Actuarial's contention that the trial court erred in affirming the commission's
decision that section 60.2-612(8) did not apply to Lipcsey's case
and that Lipcsey was entitled to full benefits. The court of
appeals noted that the issue of whether the cap on benefits
contained in section 60.2-612(8) applies only to a claimant who
is terminated immediately after giving notice of his resignation
was one of first impression in Virginia."9 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's holding that Virginia Code section
60.2-612(8) did not apply to Lipcsey's case and that Lipcsey was
entitled to full benefits.'93
The court of appeals took issue with the trial court's and
commission's interpretation of section 60.2-612(8). The trial
court and the commission had interpreted "subsequently" in the
statute to mean "immediately" and determined that Lipcsey's
eligibility for unemployment benefits was not capped at two
weeks "because she was fired two days after she gave notice of
her resignation to appellant.""9 The court of appeals concluded that based on the plain meaning of the word "subsequently"
and the obvious intent of the General Assembly, the term
"'subsequently' as used in Code § 60.2-612(8) means 'at any
time after notice is given and before the end of the notice period.""95 Further, the court stated that to interpret "subsequently" in the statute so that the two-week cap on benefits
applies only to claimants fired immediately upon receipt of
their notice of resignation "would create a loophole not intended
by the General Assembly and would thwart the purpose of the
Unemployment Compensation Act."" The court remanded the
case to the trial court "with directions to reverse the commission in part and remand the claim to the commission for proceedings to determine whether Ms. Lipcsey's eligibility is limited to the twelve days of her notice period that were unpaid

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See i& at 646, 478 S.E.2d at 738.
See i& at 646-47, 478 S.E.2d at 738.
See i& at 646, 478 S.E.2d at 738.
Id.
Id. at 648, 478 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 649, 478 S.E.2d at 740.
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because she cannot establish good cause for leaving pursuant to
197
Code [section] 60.2-618(1)."
In Virginia Employment Commission v. Nunery,98 the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the Richmond City Circuit
Court,reinstating the commission's interpretation of its statute.
In this appeal, the VEC contended that the circuit court erred
in failing to reduce Nunery's unemployment benefits by the
amount of the social security disability benefits she received
retroactively in a lump sum payment."
Nunery received unemployment benefits between 1992 and
1994. In 1993, Nunery applied for social security disability
benefits. Her claim was initially denied, but in 1995, an administrative law judge for the Social Security Administration found
that she was entitled to social security benefits and for supplemental security income benefits for periods which overlapped
with her receipt of unemployment benefits. 21 She subsequently received the social security benefits in one lump sum pay20
ment.

1

After the 1995 decision by the Social Security Administration
awarded Nunery her social security benefits retroactively, a
deputy of the VEC declared Nunery ineligible for unemployment
benefits for certain time periods during 1992 through 1994.'
The denial of these benefits was for time periods that overlapped with other periods for which she had been awarded the
retroactive social security benefits. In addition, the deputy
found Nunery liable for repayment of the unemployment benefits she received during those overlapping periods.2'
Nunery appealed the VEC determination and the VEC appeals examiner conducted an evidentiary hearing.' The VEC
appeals examiner affrmed the deputy's determination. He
found that pursuant to Virginia Code section 60.2-604, Nunery
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Id. at 651, 478 S.E.2d at 740-41.
24 Va. App. 617, 484 S.E.2d 609 (1997).
See id. at 619, 484 S.E.2d at 609-10.
See id.
See id. at 620, 484 S.E.2d at 610.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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was not eligible to receive unemployment benefits for the time
periods that overlapped with her receipt of social security benefits. Thus, the unemployment benefits Nunery received were
subject to a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the amount of the
social security benefits received for overlapping time periods.
The VEC special examiner affirmed the appeals examiner's
decision. 5
Nunery appealed to the circuit court which reversed the
VEC's decision and held that section 60.2-604 required a reduction or offset of unemployment benefits only when the applicant
for unemployment benefits "is receiving" concurrent payments
for the period during which the unemployment compensation is
paid.' The circuit court found that Nunery's receipt of social
security benefits retroactively after her unemployment benefits
were paid did not fall under the language of the statute because Nunery was not "receiving" pension or retirement benefits
at the same time that she received unemployment benefits.0 7
The circuit court reasoned that the statute should be liberally
construed so as to achieve the primary purpose of the Virginia
Unemployment Compensation Act "to provide temporary financial assistance" to workers who are involuntarily displaced from
the work force. 2 3 Reversing the VEC's decision, the circuit
court held that Nunery was entitled to retain all funds and was
not liable for any reduction or set-off amounts.2 °
The court of appeals disagreed with the circuit court's interpretation of the statute, and reversed its denial of the offset
previously determined by the VEC. The court of appeals found
that Nunery's eligibility to receive both the unemployment
benefits and the social security benefits coincided and the lump
sum award for social security benefits was "reasonably attributable" to weeks during which she received unemployment
benefits. 20 Accordingly, the court found the offset provision of
Virginia Code section 60.2-604 applied to the overlap of time

205.
206.
1996).
207.
208.
209.
210.

See iL
See Nunery v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 39 Va. Cir. 454 (Richmond City
See id. at 455.
I& at 456.
See iSee Nunery, 24 Va. App. at 624, 484 S.E.2d at 612.
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periods during which Nunery received employment benefits and
during which
she was eligible to receive social security
21
payments.

1

As support for its reasoning, the court of appeals looked to
the requirement that the state's unemployment program must
be in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Federal
Unemployment

Tax Act to receive federal benefits. 2 '

The

court noted that Congress' purpose in enacting the federal
statute was "to eliminate duplicative benefits and preserve the
fiscal integrity of the unemployment compensation in a rational
manner. 21s
The court of appeals stated that "[tihe practical effect of the
federal statute [was] to create, on a uniform basis throughout
the United States, a dollar-for-dollar reduction of unemployment
insurance benefits by income received from the designated
'wage replacement' sources."2 4 It found that the trial court's
interpretation of the statute to restrict the application of the
offset requirement "defeats the Congressional rationale and the
General Assembly's adherence to the federal directive." The
court also found important the fact that a majority of jurisdictions which had addressed the issue of whether the federal
statute requires that unemployment compensation benefits be
offset by the amount of Social Security benefits received by the
unemployed worker have held that the unemployment compensation benefits must be so offset where the base period employer contributed to the Social Security system. 6
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the 1997 General Assembly made no substantive
changes to VAPA and made several revisions to agency law
which affect agency decision making, the most important developments in the 1997 General Assembly for administrative law
211.
212.
213.
(D.N.J.
214.
215.
216.

See id.
See id. at 621, 404 S.E.2d at 611.
Id. at 624, 484 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting McKay v. Horn, 529 F. Supp. 847, 863
1981)).
Id at 625, 484 S.E.2d at 613.
Id.
Id. at 623 n.2, 484 S.E.2d at 612 n.2.
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were those indications of changes in VAPA which appear to be
on the horizon. Several amendments to VAPA failed, but garnered considerable support. Two bills passed that implement
studies and propose changes to VAPA. It does not appear that
the Commonwealth's fundamental law of administrative procedure will remain unchanged.
The state circuit courts and the court of appeals also continued to shape administrative procedure through case law. The
actions of these courts indicate aggressiveness on the part of
the circuit courts to overturn agency decisions and a tendency
of the court of appeals to rein in the circuit courts.

